Resource Nationalism and Geopolitics in Africa

In the race for access to critical and rare-earth minerals, Africa again finds itself in the front line of a scramble for resources. This time its leaders are determined to reap the benefits.

African Raw Material Export Bans: Protectionism or Self-Determination?

As the energy transition gathers pace, the need to access the essential raw materials which underpin it is also accelerating. Some basic statistics evidence this demand:

· An electric car needs six times more rare earth minerals than a conventional vehicle;

· An onshore wind plant needs nine times more materials than a comparable gas facility;

· Between 2017 and 2022, the energy sector drove a tripling of global demand for lithium, whilst demand for cobalt and nickel rose by 70% and 40% [i] respectively;

· Between three to 6.5 billion tonnes of transitional minerals will be needed over the next three decades if the world is to meet its climate goals[ii].

The current and future global demand for transitional metals and minerals offers a potentially huge economic opportunity[iii]. This is particularly the case for Africa, where more than 50% of the world’s cobalt and manganese, 92% of its platinum and significant quantities of lithium and copper are to be found. Almost all of the continent’s current output is presently shipped as ore for processing in third countries (primarily China), meaning the potential economic benefit of this enormous mineral wealth has not filtered through to the real economics in its African source countries[iv]. Africa exports roughly 75% of its crude oil, which is refined elsewhere and re-imported as (more expensive) petroleum products; and exports 45% of its natural gas, whilst 600 million Africans have no access to electricity (approximately 53% of the continent’s population)[v].

A number of African governments have expressed their determination to avoid repeating the ‘resource curse’ mistakes of the past, by using the continent’s natural resources to drive domestic economic growth, while creating meaningful domestic job opportunities, rather than exporting them and the consequent economic growth elsewhere. This approach has led a number of African countries to impose export restrictions on raw minerals; promote domestic processing; and demand that agreements with third countries promote technology transfers and improve domestic processing capacities and workforce skills.

Whilst African countries are absolutely right to want to retain more of the commercial and economic benefit of their natural resources for the development of their own countries, rather than enriching third-party processor nations, the move to protect national resources in this manner has coincided with a global move towards protectionism and a rise in great-power competition which has made the race for the raw materials necessary to power the energy transition even more acute. This competition can be seen in President Trump’s ‘interest’ in the natural resources of Greenland, Canada and Ukraine. And in the tense negotiations which have played out in London over the past few days between the US and China over access to processed critical minerals.

And as the Great Power competition heats up, there is a growing risk that Western extractives companies become collateral becoming leverage. Russian influence in the Sahel Region of Africa has already been effective in pushing Western companies out and replacing them with Russian companies. There is some evidence of Chinese government influence in other parts of Africa pursuing a similar path, using influence which ranges from disinformation campaigns aimed at damaging companies’ reputations and bottom-lines, to offers of ‘no-strings-attached’ mining contracts which are not subject to (Western-imposed) compliance and BHR requirements.

Sustainable use of transition minerals

But, leaving geopolitical machinations aside for a moment, and returning to equitable access to resources there is a story to also tell about how African governments are planning to avoid a new ‘Scramble for Africa’ and secure the benefits of the demand for critical raw materials and rare earth minerals for the development and economic progress of their own countries.

In February 2024 a Resolution to promote equitable benefit-sharing from extraction and calling for the sustainable use of transitional minerals was presented UN environmental assembly in Nairobi. The Resolution, which was supported by a group of mainly African countries including the DRC, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Chad, was described as being ‘crucial for African countries, the environment and the future of [African nations’] populations.”[vi] The UNSG in a press release[vii] dated 26 April, 2024 noted and accepted the importance of using the energy transition and the race to secure the raw materials critical to its success to ‘create jobs, diversify economies, and dramatically boost revenues’ in resource-rich developing countries.

And (quite rightly) many African countries are not waiting for the West’s permission, but have already taken steps to protect their natural resources and move up the processing value chain[viii]. This trend is only likely to accelerate.

African Protection of Natural Resources

Tanzania

Under its 2017 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act[ix], every company extracting natural resources in Tanzania must give the Government a minimum of 16% free carried interest. The law also gives the government the right to acquire more shares based on the level of investment and strategic importance of the project — up to 50% or more in some cases. The 16% share provision gives Tanzania a say in decision-making, board representation, and direct profit-sharing from the mining companies. This legal provision was the basis for the formation in January 2021 of the Kabanga nickel-cobalt project joint venture ensuring domestic ownership in a major, strategic battery-metal mine.

Zambia

In January 2021, the state-owned mining firm ZCCM-IH took control of Mopani Copper Mines (previously majority-owned by Glencore) paying $1.5 billion to effectively nationalise the copper-cobalt operation. This move was designed to keep the strategic asset in national hands and secure more revenue for Zambia.

Burundi

In July 2021, the government suspended the operations of several foreign mining companies – notably Rainbow Rare Earths’ Gakara mine – citing “unbalanced” contracts and arguing that the State was not getting its fair share. At the same time, Burundi also halted rare earth concentrate exports (Burundi operates the only rare-earth minerals mine in Africa) and demanded contract renegotiations so that more profits benefit the country. The Mines Minister commented that “The State, which owns the soil and minerals, is not making a profit as it should,” and set out an intention to ‘[re]renegotiate…these agreements for the benefit of the people, because these minerals must be used to finance the development of the country.’

Nigeria

In July 2022[x], Nigeria banned the export of raw-ore to (in the words of its Natural Resources Minister) end the “plundering (of) the continent for raw materials” by incentivising local processing or refining before exporting and “…bring industry to Africa so that our people can be employed.”

Zimbabwe

In December 2022, in response to a global boom in lithium demand, Zimbabwe banned the export of raw lithium ore. The Mining Minister announced that no lithium-bearing ores or unbeneficiated lithium could be exported without written permission, in order ‘to spur domestic value addition and battery manufacturing in Zimbabwe’.

In January 2023, the government extended the lithium ore ban to all unprocessed base mineral ores (including nickel, chromium, manganese and tantalite). Companies with local processing facilities are exempted, reflecting a policy to retain more mineral value domestically.

Namibia

In June 2023, Namibia’s Cabinet approved a ban on exporting unprocessed critical minerals, including crushed lithium ore, cobalt, manganese, graphite, dysprosium and terbium – although, with special ministerial approval, it is still possible to export small quantities of these minerals. The government noted that, with high global demand for battery metals, Namibia was determined to ensure that it recouped some of the value by requiring such minerals to be at least partially processed in Namibia. This ban is of particular concern to the EU, coming just eight months after the EU signed an MoU with Namibia aimed at securing the bloc’s access to rare earth minerals.

Namibia is also one of the world’s top uranium producers, but the ban does not appear to extend to uranium.

Ghana

In July 2023, Ghana’s government adopted a “Green Minerals Policy” (aka Minerals of the Future policy) that prohibits the export of raw lithium and other green minerals[xi]. The cabinet decision (July 27, 2023) aims to “retain a significant proportion of the value chain” in-country by mandating local processing before export.

In February 2024, Ghana’s President announced a further series of measures to extract greater value from its natural resources, including:

· the construction of a refinery dedicated to processing locally-produced manganese;

· a prohibition on the export of raw bauxite[xii] (following Indonesia’s 2023 bauxite export ban) lithium and iron ore;

· the prioritization of Ghanaian investors in acquiring Newmont Corporation’s Akyem gold mine[xiii] and Atlantic Lithium’s Ewoyaa lithium project;

· the creation of a 400-kilogram capacity gold refinery.

Botswana

In July 2023, Botswana renegotiated its mining rights with De Beers to increase the share of rough stones it receives, create a dedicated diamond fund to be used for investment in “additional value to the Botswana economy”;[xiv] and require De Beers to invest in and develop the domestic diamond valule-chain.

The Sahel

Since 2020, there have been coups d’états in Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Chad and Gabon. These seven countries are important sources of gold[xv], uranium[xvi], bauxite[xvii], manganese[xviii] and iron ore.

Niger

After seizing power in July 2023, the Nigerien military junta imposed a moratorium on all State export contracts, with the intention of reviewing them to ‘improve their commercial fairness’ – a provision which includes pegging prices of exported minerals to trading prices quoted on international bourses. In December 2024, the State back control of a French-operated Uranium mine, after having refused to renew its licence in June 2024.

Guinea

Since mid-2023, the Guinean Government has revoked, repossessed or cancelled over 220 mining licences for raw materials including bauxite, gold, diamonds, graphite, and iron. These interventions have mainly targeted smaller operators and (so far) have been focused on under-developed or underperforming licenses. The Government has explained its actions as aimed at “freeing unused resources for other investors’ by reissuing those areas to more serious developers. The government has also exerted pressure on major bauxite exporters to commit to building local alumina refineries.

The pressure on mining companies appears to be part of Guinea’s push to ensure mining assets are actively exploited and contributing to the economy, rather than held speculatively. So far, the Guinean government has avoided the major operators, but it may feel emboldened by the lack of market reaction to take more aggressive action against them in the future.

Mali

In August 2023, the ruling junta enacted a new Mining Code allowing the state to take up to 30% ownership in any new mining project (10% free equity plus an optional 20% purchase within two years). The code also eliminated certain tax exemptions for foreign mining firms. While Mali is a major gold producer, the reforms were driven mainly by new lithium projects coming on-line (with, at 14% of continental production, Mali set to become Africa’s second largest lithium producer). The government has explicitly stated its intention to ensure that the sale of its lithium accurately reflects the value of the product on international markets.

DRC

In February 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo – source of 78% of the world’s cobalt – announced a four-month ban on cobalt exports due to an “overabundance of supply on the international market,” with authorities hinting at possible longer-term restrictions (quotas, tariffs or extending the ban). Similarly with other decisions taken by African Governments, the decision reflects the DRC’s increasing desire to ensure that the country gains a greater domestic benefit from its raw materials production. The four-month period expires later this month – it is still not clear whether the DRC Government will allow unrestricted export of raw cobalt following the expiry of the ban.

What is Driving this Phenomenon?

a) Geopolitics

Political uncertainty often complicates operating conditions for international mining companies. Foreign mining companies are often portrayed as agents of foreign states, which can create difficulty in renewing contracts or obtaining permits.

Russia regularly hosts Russia–Africa Summits, at which it contrasts its no-strings “sovereignty” and security deals to those offered by Western companies/governments. Russia has leveraged (possibly fomented) insecurity in the Sahel, exchanging military backing and security support for minerals and encouraging the expulsion of Western troops[xix]. Russia’s willingness to undertake such transactional deals is only likely to increase the importance of its role in Sahel countries, whilst the growing links between China, Russia and Iran present serious security issues for Western governments – for example with regards to access to Uranium[xx]. This in turn may increase the complexity of operating in those countries as greater Russia involvement in Africa brings with it increased political risk.

Evidence of Russian interference against Western mining and extractives companies is strongest in The Sahel Region:

· Mali. Since the 2021 coup, Mali’s junta (backed by Wagner) has strongly pressured Western gold miners. In 2024 it detained Barrick Gold and Resolute Mining staff over contract disputes and seized gold stockpiles, forcing Barrick to freeze operations and pay a reported $438 million to resume mining. Wagner-linked operators encouraged Malian officials to nationalize or renegotiate lucrative gold contracts in favor of Russian interests.

· Niger. After Niger’s 2023 coup, the military government acted against French nuclear mining firm Orano. In July 2024 Niger revoked Orano’s permit at one of its uranium mines (for allegedly failing to resume production after militant attacks). This coincided with Russian state group Rosatom negotiating to take over Niger’s uranium assets. By late 2024 Niger’s mining minister was publicly courting Russian companies for uranium exploration.

· Burkina Faso. Burkina’s 2022 military government has shifted decisively away from Western partners. In April 2025 it awarded a new industrial gold licence on the Kourweogo (Niou) deposit to Russia’s Nordgold. This move, amid high gold prices, “signals deepening economic ties between Russia and Burkina Faso” and a pivot to Moscow over traditional Western allies.

But there is also evidence of growing Russian influence in resource nationalism decisions taken in other African countries:

· The Central African Republic. Since 2018. Russian paramilitaries (the Wagner Group – now re-named the Africa Corps) have secured gold and diamond mining concessions in return for protecting CAR’s government in a form of State Capture where economic and political benefits flow to Russian-linked entities rather than the population.

· Sudan. Since 2017, The Wagner Group have ‘protected’ gold, uranium, and diamond sites. Contracts, such as with "Meroe Gold," grant Russian firms strategic mining access.

· Libya and Madagascar. Russian paramilitary groups initially provided security and then subsequently acquired mineral assets — chromium in Madagascar and gold & diamonds in Libya.

· Mozambique. The Wagner Group (and subsequently the Africa Corps signed security agreements with the Governments, in return receiving mining and natural resource concessions (mainly in gold, diamonds, uranium, and rare earth minerals).

· Zimbabwe. The Government has been fairly explicit in replacing Western mining partners with Russian ones. In 2019 the government licensed only Russia’s state-controlled Alrosa (and China’s Anjin) to explore new diamond concessions, excluding firms like De Beers. The Mines Minister confirmed that De Beers and other Western companies were “not among those licensed” – a policy which effectively prevented renewal or extension of Western companies’ diamond licences and created space for Russian entrants.

b) African Solutions

However, in many other African countries where Governments have taken the decision to revoke, rescind or refuse licence renewal, the explication is domestic. African governments are keen to avoid the “resource curse” (by restricting or banning mineral exports) and move up the value chain (by boosting domestic processing) to increase domestic value extraction from mining and resource wealth. From the perspective of the African government and society, this harder-nosed approach makes good sense in an era where, following agreement at COP28 to triple global renewables capacity and double energy efficiency, global demand for critical and rare earth minerals is only going to increase. Done right, it will ensure a better-educated and more economically-participative workforce, engaged in higher-value economic activities. And will avoid raw materials being exported for a low price and its processed final form being re-imported at a higher price (imposing both an unnecessary cost and loss to the local economy).

The approach is not without risk. Foreign mining companies, whose expertise is arguably key to commercial success, will demand certainty about: political risk; the presence of mineral processing infrastructure (including freight and port facilities); a stable electrical supply; a battery value chain; reliable legal frameworks (including ESG protections); and sound financial management, ensuring effective use of tax revenues. Without those reassurances and the accompanying infrastructure, export bans could have a chilling effect on or divert foreign investment. The DRC cobalt ban has already forced battery producers to intensify their research into alternative component materials.

International Support

The African Union is developing an African Green Minerals Strategy[xxi], which aims to improve mining regulation and institutions, and build a more attractive investment environment. And some African countries have begun to cooperate across international borders to strengthen African collaboration in developing domestic processing expertise – in 2022 the DRC and Zambia signed an agreement to set up special economic zones in both nations for the development of EVs and batteries, backed by private and public funding in a bid to begin the shift from exporting to domestic processing.

A report[xxii] produced in August 2023 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development noted:

· the potential of African Nations’ mineral wealth to enable them to be key suppliers of automotive parts and components and encouraged them to make deals with automotive and battery producers to acquire technology and knowledge, while engaging in domestic processing to “… avoid being locked into the provision of ‘just’ raw materials, which results in very low-value integration into global supply chains.”

· the importance of “equal terms of mining contracts and policies [in] catalysing lateral linkages between large-scale mining and local productive industrial development”;

· the important role of national incentives and regional cooperation in helping domestic companies gain competitive advantage in the mining sector.

In April 2024, the UNSG convened an international Pane[xxiii]l to address equity, sustainability and human rights across the value chains of critical energy transition minerals. The Panel was tasked with improving national management of mineral resources to ensure that increased demand for them does not ‘perpetuate commodity dependence, exacerbating geopolitical tensions’; and to help produce ‘globally agreed guidance to ensure responsible, fair and just value chains.’ The Panel’s Report, which was published in September 2024[xxiv] makes a series of recommendations for fairness, transparency, investment, sustainability and human rights, but along the entire minerals value chain, from refining and manufacturing to transport and end-of-use recycling.

The EU has begun to recognize it has an obligation (and a need) to act in this space to seek alternative mineral trade partners to China and Russia (and avoid a risk of supply disruption) and to help African countries benefit from their own raw materials. In March 2023, the EU unveiled in its Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to make the bloc less dependent on single suppliers by boosting EU mineral industries as well as offering African supply countries a more equal contractual footing through long-term raw materials and value chain partnerships.

Conclusion

Protectionism is on the rise around the world as the post-second world war political and economic consensus breaks down. Alongside this trend, the energy transition has unleashed a new scramble for green resources. These two factors come together with particularly noticeable effect in Africa. The collision of protectionism and the increasing need for access to green resources will impact most parts of the economy. But it will affect mining companies most of all. The stakes are high, with the world’s major powers competing for resources and influence. The outcome of this intense competition for resources will determine whether the energy transition is ultimately successful and the worst ravages of climate change can be avoided. But to succeed, the energy transition must be a just transition – one from which African countries must benefit. Resource nationalism without the necessary legal, financial and infrastructure investment could be counter-productive for African nations. But done right, it could attract investment, training, jobs and infrastructure in a way which is genuinely beneficial for African nations and their populations.

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[i] IEA report July 2023

[ii] https://www.energy-transitions.org/bitesize/its-in-the-charts-materials-needed-to-deliver-the-energy-transition/#:~:text=Between%202022%E2%80%932050%2C%20the%20energy,electric%20vehicles%20and%20other%20technologies quotes 6.5 billion tonnes between now and 2050. The UNEP quotes 3 billion tonnes.

[iii] Bloomberg estimates the global market for electric vehicles alone estimated to be worth $7 trillion by 2030

[iv] The DRC produces 67% of the world’s cobalt, but remains one of the world’s poorest countries, whilst China refines 73% of all cobalt – along with 40% of copper, 59% of lithium and 67% of nickel.

[v] UNCTAD report titled “Commodities at a glance: Special issue on access to energy in sub-Saharan Africa”

[vi] https://africa-energy-portal.org/news/african-leaders-call-equity-over-minerals-used-clean-energy

[vii] https://www.un.org/en/nairobi-unis/press-release-un-convened-panel-address-equity-sustainability-and-human-rights-across

[viii] Africa Development Forum report, May 2023.

[ix] https://www.madini.go.tz/media/Natural-Wealth-and-Resources-Permanent-Sovereignty-Act-2017.pdf

[x] https://guardian.ng/news/government-moves-to-end-exportation-of-raw-minerals/

[xi] https://energycapitalpower.com/ghana-green-minerals-policy-approval/

[xii] Ghana’s bauxite reserves are approximately 920 million tonnes

[xiii] Ghana was Africa’s largest gold producer in 2023 almost all of which was exported for processing. The President was explicit in his determination to apply the lessons of gold mining to the production and processing of green minerals.

[xiv] De Beers press release - 3 July 2023

[xv] According to S&P Global Commodity Insights, these seven countries were responsible for 7.2% of global gold production in 2022.

[xvi] Ibid: Niger produced 4.1% of the world’s uranium

[xvii] Ibid: Guinea produced 22.6% of the world’s bauxite, an aluminum ore.

[xviii] Ibid:Gabon accounted for 23.0% of global production of manganese.

[xix] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/22/russia-niger-us-security-pact

[xx] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/05/10/l-uranium-du-niger-au-c-ur-de-negociations-clandestines-avec-l-iran_6232514_3212.html

[xxi] https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44539-doc-AGMS_Final_doc.pdf

[xxii] Economic Development in Africa Report August 2023

[xxiii] https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/cetm_panel_launch_press_release-04-2024.pdf

[xxiv] https://press.un.org/en/2024/en332.doc.htm